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JAPAN'S ECONCeiC SUCCESS 
FOLLOWING HER WORLD WAR I I DEFEAT 
World War I I destroyed the Japanese Empire and put Japan under 
foreign occupation for nearly seven years. This was followed, however, 
by a rapid economic recovery and now, scarcely twenty-eight years 
l a t e r , Japan i s one of the leading i n d u s t r i a l nations of the world. In 
a few short decades she has moved frora a physically and economically 
devastated nation to the world's t h i r d largest producer of goods and 
services, Japan's extraordinary teach for economic ascendancy has 
captured the attention of the worl?l. For some people the center of 
interest l i e s i n the miraculous economic growth rate. For others, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the developing countries, the interest l i e s i n the 
factors of Japan's economic growth. For those i n the developed countries, 
the concern i s with Japan's economic planning, and in the future economic, 
p o l i t i c a l , and m i l i t a r y balance. S t i l l , many people question whether 
Japan can survive economic growth, and i f she does, when w i l l i t end? 
The pages that follow seek to look at these and other areas of 
interest i n Japan's economic growth, starting with a general sieauiary 
of her rate of economic grox^h since V7orld War I I . 
THE VJiTE OF ECONCS'llG GROWTH SINCE WORLD I/AR I I 
The x^ar l e f t Japan in ruins. She was economically completely 
exhausted, a quarter of her material wealth was destroyed, and her 
GN? at the end of the x^ar was only iia l f of the pre-war peak. By A p r i l 
of 1949, the preliminary task of restoring production and productive 
ef f i c i e n c y had only begun,^ 
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i n f l a t i o n was a serious handicap to recovery, Japan, after the 
war, experienced excessive domestic demand along with large budget 
2 
d e f i c i t s which together resulted in steep price increases. The post-
war domestic demand that accompanied i n f l a t i o n made the maintenance 
of an appropriate flow of exports d i f f i c u l t , for output that might 
have been available for export was otherwise absorbed and prices were 
pushed to non-competitive l e v e l s . I n f l a t i o n a r y pressure also stimulated 
imports, including imports of goods which were not necessary for essential 
consumption and investment, 
Japan's exports increased rapidly in 1951, but suffered a setback 
i n 1952 and for the year as a whole t h e i r t o t a l value declined. Dollar 
exports (exports tp the United States and Canada) tended to increase 
but s t e r l i n g exports (exports to the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia 
and the Union of South A f r i c a ) declined. Although imports remained 
high with a general tendency to increase, Japan was not in balance of 
payments d i f f i c u l t i e s i n 1952. Her dollar position also remained fav-
orable through abnormally large " I n v i s i b l e " receipts from U.S. expcndi-
3 
tures and the U,N, armed forces, 
Th^ rapid r i s e of i n d u s t r i a l production aftd consumption raised 
imports i n 1953 so that by the f i r s t quarter of 1954 they were more 
than 25% greater than a year e a r l i e r . The rapid advances i n productivity 
were made possible by the reconstruction of the Japanese economjr. However, 
the expansion of exports was hampered by inflationary pressures operative 
since 1950 and by r e s t r i c t i o n s on imports from Japan, which made i t 
d i f f i c u l t for Japan to earn the means to pay for the food and raw materials 
necessary for i n d u s t r i a l recovery. An Increased import surplus thus 
2 
developed due to r e s t r i c t i o n s other countries placed on Japanese 
exports (see graph in appendix). Even when some of these r e s t r i c t i o n s 
were removed late in 1953, exports f a i l e d to recover to any substantial 
4 
extent. 
Lack of control of i n f l a t i o n i n Japan and the continuance of import 
controls elsex/nere made Japan extremely dependent on the United States 
Government expenditures associated with the Korean War to help restore 
equilibrium i n her balance of payments situation,'^ Japan had to face 
the certain prospect that receipts from expenditures by U.3, Armed 
Forces x^ould decline sharply. Therefore at the end of 1953, strong 
monetary action was i n i t i a t e d i n the hope of curbing i n f l a t i o n . The 
growth of the money supply was checked, loans by the Bank of Japan f e l l 
s ubstantially, the f a l l i n foreign exchange reserves was checked, and 
there waS a recovery of confidence i n the currency,* 
As the re s u l t of the contractive monetary policy, the increase i n 
Japanese i n d u s t r i a l production i n 1954 (7%) was considerably smaller 
than the increase (22%) from 1952 to 1953,'' This temporary slackness 
in doteestic output along with a decline i n domestic consteaption produced 
a sharp reduction of imports. 
At the swne time, the value of exports rose by almost one-third due 
to lower r e s t r i c t i o n s on Japanese exports, her r i s i n g competitive power, 
the increasing a v a i l a b i l i t y of exportable goods and the restoration of 
prewar conKiercial connections. Exports to the United States expanded 
by 22% despite the U.S. recession, exports to the s t e r l i n g area increased 
o 
by about 55%, and shipments to Latin America nearly doubled. 
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The increase i n eirports cut the Japanese trade d e f i c i t by more than 
h a l f , to $420 m i l l i o n , and the balance of payments moved frwa an over-
a l l d e f i c i t of almost $200 mi l l i o n i n 1953 to a surplus of $100 million 
9 
i n 1954, DisinflaticKi played a de f i n i t e role in the r e c t i f i c a t i o n of 
the balance of payments, 
Japan realized a balance of payments surplus i n 1955 but under 
the St r a i n of intepse i n d u s t r i a l expansion and a r e v i v a l of domestic 
demand, the surplus dwindled i n the course of 1956 and was followed 
by a d e f i c i t i n early 1957,^° 
i n ntillitms of 
U,3, dollars 
Balance of 
Payments 
Trade 
Balance 
1954 127 -420 
1955 379 -460 
1956 168 -729 
1957 -678 -1426 
11 
There was a major investment boom in Japan i n 1956 stimulated by 
a r i s e i n both foreign and domestic demand. Manufacturing production 
increased by 18% compared with a 9% increase i n 1955| national income 
12 
i n 1956 increased approximately 10% i n r e a l terms; and exports i n -
13 
creased by 20%, The rapid increase i n output was made possible because 
of an ample unemployed labor supply Mid the existence of surplus capacity 
i n many industries. 
The acceleration in Japan's economic a c t i v i t y caused a sharp I n -
crease i n the imports of raw materials and f u e l s . The t o t a l value of 
imports rose by 30% coapared with a r i s e of only 3% from 1954 to 1955, 
The biggest increase i n exports i n 1956 was i n the export of ships. 
As world demand rose and shipyards elsewhere faced r i s i n g costs and 
lengthening delivery periods, Japan became the world's largest ship-
builder, output i n 1956 being three times that i n 1955, Most other 
exports also increased substantially, but there was sane f a l l i n g off 
i n exports of metals, owing to the pressure of domestic requirements. 
In certain cases, Japan found i t necessary to l i m i t her exports, either 
to prevent the accumulation of i l l i q u i d credit balances or to f o r e s t a l l 
protective action by the importing country, 
Japan showed the largest proportionate increase i n exports of 
manufactures, followed by Germany, I t a l y , Belgium, and Sweden, On the 
other hand, the shares of the United Kingdom and the United States 
diminished. The following chart i l l u s t r a t e s the extent to which r e l a t i v e 
movements i n export prices were correlated with differences in the expan-
sion of the volume of exports over the period 1953-1956.^* 
ferc&nt Changes from 1953 to 1956 i n Volume and Unit Value of 
Manufactured Exports of Major i n d u s t r i a l Countries 
Country Volume unit Value 
Japan +122 -6 
Germany, Federal Republic of • 70 +2 
I t a l y +59 ••2 
Belgium-Luxembourg +48 -3 
Sweden +45 +1 
Hethe.r lands +31 — 
Switzerland +26 -4 
Prance +21 +1 
United States +20 +5 
United Kingdom + 19 +5 
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The competitive position of Japan was strengthened by the short 
delivery dates which Japanese exporters could of f e r . Discrimination 
formerly practiced against Japanese goods i n various parts of the world 
had decreased, and the quality of supplies readily available for export 
improved with the progress of Japan's i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . 
Strains on domestic resources began to appear i n early 1957 i n the 
fona of a decline i n foreign exchange reserves and a further r i s e i n 
consisaer prices. With the declared objective of pruning excess invest-
ment demand, the Bank of Japan raised the interest rate from 7,3% to 
8,4%^' 
The investment boom i n Japan continued into 1957 and caused an even 
sharper deterioration i n Japan's balance of payments than i n 1956, There 
was an increase of almost 60% i n private expenditure on durable equip-
ment and inventory accumulation during 1956, and t h i s situation continued 
IS 
unabated into 1957, While world i n d u s t r i a l production grew by only 
2^% from 1956 to 1957, Japan's output expanded by 17% oyer the same 
19 
period. 
Accompanying the investment boom and the increased manufacturing 
output were increasing s t r a i n s on s t e e l , transport, and generating 
capacity, and the l i b e r a l i z a t i o n of imports, p a r t i c u l a r l y of raw materials. 
This led to an acceleration i n the groxrth of imports. Imports of par-
t i c u l a r importance were metals and ores, fuels and machinery, and t e x t i l e 
materials. The volume of imports rose almost three times as f a s t ( by 
28%, compared with 10%) between the second half of 1956 and the f i r s t 
half of 1957 as between the two halves of 1956,^'' 
« 
VJhile the growth of iiaports accelerated rapidly, the volume of 
exports declined s l i g h t l y , and the balance of payments surplus f e l l 
from $120 million to $48 million between the two halves of 1956, and 
i n the f i r s t half of 1957, there was a d e f i c i t of $514 million.''^ 
To help improve the balance of payments, a matter which i s of considerable 
importance for a country so dependent as Japan on international trade 
and therefore on conditions abroad, Japan i n t e n s i f i e d her r e s t r i c t i o n s 
on imports by 1 - postponing investment and other expenditure, 2 - r e -
s t r i c t i n g credit f a c i l i t i e s for imports, 3 - increasing advance deposit 
requirements for imports, and 4 - cutting the exchange allocation for 
22 
cotton and wool imports. 
As demand receded, inventories of finished goods accumulated. Man-
ufacturing output declined. The volume of imports f e l l . The volume of 
exports was some ll|7o higher, so that the r a t i o of exports to output, 
which had f a l l e n sharply i n the f i r s t half of the year, was by the end 
of the year again about the same as i t had been a year before, 
"The fact that Japanese exports rose less from 1956 to 1957 than 
from 1955 to 1956 seemd to have been due less to pressure of internal 
demand than to the quite exceptional increase i n exports of ships from 
1955 to 1956, which could not be repeated in 1957, Although the expan-
sion of t e x t i l e exports to the United States and certain other markets 
was s t i l l hampered by the r e s t r i c t i o n s imposed by the Japanese authorities 
to f o r e s t a l l protective action by those countries, t o t a l t e x t i l e exports 
24 
increased nearly as rapidly as from 1955 to 1956," 
The table on the following page gives some indication of the r e l a t i v e 
export competitiveness of various i n d u s t r i a l countries. Exports from 
7 
Japan, Germany, and I t a l y continued to grow three times as f a s t as those 
from the other leading exporters of manufactures, and accounted for 
nearly half of the grovxth of world trade in raanufactures fr<Ma 1956 to 
1937, The a v a i l a b i l i t y of atople capacity and manpower was an important 
factor fostering t h i s growth. The slackening i n the rate of expansion 
of Japanese manufactured exports was confined to ships, exports of which 
had t r i p l e d from 1955 to 1956*^ 
(percentage increase Mfg, Export 
or decrease frora Production Imports Exports Iftiit Value 
previous year) 1956 1957 1956 1957 1956 1957 1956 1957 
Japan 22 17 27 23 20 13 4 3 
Btance 12 9 15 6 -6 13 4 1 
I t a l y 8 8 13 11 18 17 1 1 
Gertaany, Fed Rep of 8 6 12 12 17 16 3 2 
Austria 4 3 7 14 18 16 3 
Sweden 3 4 6 7 13 11 3 3 
Switzerland • , , , • , 15 6 11 6 — 2 
Norway 4 3 8 - I 17 1 13 11 
Netherlands 4 2 13 5 2 4 2 5 
United Kingdom -1 2 -1 4 6 2 4 3 
Belgium-Luxembourg 6 — • 11 2 13 -3 2 4 
United States 3 9 2 11 9 6 4 
Total 4 2,5 9 7 10 9 4 3 
The r e s t r i c t i v e budgetary and credit measures taken i n May 1957 to 
check the investment boom and remedy the deteribration i n the balance 
of pajmients were successful i n achieving their aim. By the second 
quarter of 1953, there was a net accumulation of inventories} private 
fixed capital investment had declined; private consumption continued to 
r i s e ; and wholesale prices were down by 9% from the preceding year. 
Import paytitents, which had been very high i n 1957, f e l l i n 1958 by some 
29%, the voliane of imports declining by 19% and import prices by 13%, 
However, the volume of imports i n 1958 was s t i l l s l i g h t l y greater than 
in 1956, The largest declines i n volume from 1957 to 1958 were i n 
t e x t i l e materials, coal, and metallic ores due to the decrease i n economic 
^. 27 a c t i v i t y . 
With the reduction i n both the volume and the unit value of importa, 
Japan's balance of pajxtnents improved i n 1958 as she also improved her 
competitive position in the world markets fax manufactures, with the 
improvement i n the payments position, most of thenEfiSures designed 
s p e c i f i c a l l y to tighten import financing i n 1957 were withdraw; the 
discount rate was lowered; and tax exemption l i m i t s for incomes from 
28 
exports were l i b e r a l i z e d to encourage exports. 
The value of exports, which had r i s e n at an average rate of 25% 
per annum froa 1953 to 1956 and by 14% from 1956 to 1957, was p r a c t i c a l l y 
the same i n 1958 as i n 1957 due to the ef f e c t s of a post-war recession 
in the United States and the i n d u s t r i a l countries. Although the volume 
of Japanese exports rose by 7%, export prices f e l l by a similar percentage. 
T e x t i l e exports, in f a c t , f e l l by 10% i n value. 
Japan's manufacturing output, which hod increased between 1955 
and 1957 at an annual rate of over 20%, f e l l by 5% during the recession,^^ 
However, Japan showed signs of renewed expansion of econcxp-ic a c t i v i t y 
toward the end of 1958 and her exports continued to increase though at 
a reduced rate. 
I n both Europe and Japan, the continued r i s e i n producticwi was 
largely attributable to increases i n productivity resulting from sub-
s t a n t i a l investments i n previous years. I t was accompanied by a further 
decline i n unemplojxraent. The ensuing r i s e i n private consumption not 
t 
only supported the expansion, but also further stimulated private 
investment i n plant and equipment. Intensified international Competition 
and productivity gains contributed to keeping prices r e l a t i v e l y stable, 
Japan i n i960 with i t s high rate of i n d u s t r i a l growth should have 
been i n a strong balance of payments position but, l i k e most manufacturing 
countries except for Germany, France and the United States, tlie deterioration 
in the balance of trade caused a decline i n the current account surplus, 
Japan's iiaports increased by 25% i n 1960 stimulated by r i s i n g domestic 
a c t i v i t y and the l i b e r a l i z a t i o n of trade ( I ^ e r a program adopted i n 
June 1960, l i b e r a l i z a t i o n of imports was to be extended within three 
31 32 years to 80% of imports ) , while exports rose only by 17%, The 
slower growth of exports reflected the fact that exports to the United 
33 
States rose by only 5%, 
i n i t i a l l y the United States led the other ind u s t r i a l countries i n 
the economic expansion that followed the 1957 - 1958 recession, HoiTOVer, 
after mid-1959, the r i s e i n economic a c t i v i t y became more vigorous i n 
Europe and Japan, and e a r l y i n 1960 the expansion was halted i n the 
United States, whereas i t continued i n most of the other i n d u s t r i a l 
countries. These different c y c l i c a l developments i n various countries 
were reflected in the divergent rates of growth of production i n Europe 
and Japan, on the one hand, and i n North America (the United States and 
34 
Canada) on the other. 
During the course of 1962j aconoaic a c t i v i t y continued to expand i n 
most i n d u s t r i a l countries. However, i n Japan there were minor decreases 
i n a c t i v i t y in the course ©f the year, i n part responding to pol i c i e s 
directed toward strengthening the balance of payments and alao to curbing 
10 
the excessive expansion i n the domestic economy. These s t a b i l i z a t i o n 
raeasnres introduced i n the. autimin of 1961 caused a lessening i n private 
fixed investment and a decrease i n inventory accumulation which i n turn 
Caused a slackening qf growth in Japan i n 1962, On the other hand, 
these measures caused exports to increase markedly i n 1962, and the 
grovxth i n private consumption lost l i t t l e momentum since the r i s e in 
wages was substantial for the whole year. 
The d e f i c i t i n Japan's balance of payments was brought on by an 
excessively high rate of economic expansion combined with the effects 
on exports of the 196Q recession in the United States, The predominant 
factor that changed the trade balance from a d e f i c i t of $558 million in 
1961 to a surplus of $402 mi l l i o n i n 1962 was the expansion of exports 
by 16% following an increase of only 5% from 1960 to 1961, 
Exports of Itanufactured Goods, 1959-1962 "^^ 
Value f.o.b. Percentage Change frora 
( b i l l i o n U.S. d o l l a r s ) Preceding Year 
1959 1960 1961 1962 1959 i960 1961 1962 
3,04 3.62 3.76 4,39 21 19 5 16 
The renewed sharp r i s e i n exports was stimulated in large part not 
only by the recovery of economic a c t i v i t y i n the United States, but also 
by reduced discrimination against Japanese exports in Europe, Japan's 
exports to the United States rose 32% fron 1961 to 1962 after a laarked 
36 
decline from 1960 to 1961, Imports from the United States decreased 
by considerably more than the decline i n Japan's t o t a l imoorts'*'' which 
were 5% lower than i n 1961, after r i s i n g by more than 25% from 1960 to 
11 
1961. The United States, as Japan's principal trading partner, f e l t 
the main impact of the reduction i n that country's imports. 
Value 
( b i l l i o n U.S. dol l a r s ) 
1960 1961 1962 
Percentage CSxange 
from 
preceding Tear 
1961 1962 
Exports to U.S. from 
other countries 
Exports to Japan 
Exports from U.S. 
Exports from other 
countries 
Total 
4,9 4.7 5.5 
1.4 
0.4 
1.8 
1.8 
0.5 
2.3 
1.5 
0.5 
2.0 
-3.9 16./ 
30.0 -18.0 
50,0 
33.0 -14.0 
This was the t h i r d time within ten years that Japanese authorities 
demonstrated their a b i l i t y to correct a balance of pajraients d e f i c i t by 
moderating the expansion of production and stepping up e f f o r t s toward 
export promotion. Their success in adjusting the balance of payments 
was p a r t i c u l a r l y notable in view of the fact that neither exports nor 
imports account for more than 10% of Japan's gross national product. 
The adjustment i n 1962 was a l l the more remarkable because i t occurred 
in the face of a continued l i b e r a l i z a t i o n of trade by Japan. 
The balance of payments remained strong through 1962 but i n 1963, 
Japan again faced a balance of payments d e f i c i t due to the very rapid 
39 
expansion in domestic demand that had taken place through 1963, 
Authorities were quick to r e s t r a i n the boom and adjust the d e f i c i t i n 
the early stages of trouble. R e s t r i c t i v e monetary po l i c i e s were int r o -
duced which markedly slowed the rate of increase i n imports. A rapid 
r i s e i h exports, supported both by strong international demand and by 
12 
the high degree of competitiveness of Japanese industry, helped to smooth 
the adjustment. During 1964, the balance of payments recovered while 
econ<»!iic growth was moderated, but was not interrupted, as i t had been 
in 1958 and 1962, By the end Of the year, the Japanese authorities 
began to rela x t h e i r policies of economic restraint.^'^ 
Exports continued to expand steadily throughout 1964, totaling 
about I more than i n 1963 while imports were only 13% higher for the 
year as a whole. Important export gains, as indicated i n the following 
table,^^ included increases i n exports to the United Kingdom of over 
25% and to the United States of 23%, This resulted i n a swing i n the 
trade balance from a d e f i c i t i n 1963 to a substantial surplus in 1964. 
T R M M B i n v i i N M w r i \c iURiNci C o v N i K i i s, 196.1 \ N I ) 1964 
r i x p o r l s to 
E x p . ; ' I S r ro i i i Y . - a r 
U n i t e d 
K i n p d . M n 
O t h e r 
E F T . A 
C o u n t r i e s 
H F C 
C o u n t [ ICS 
U n i t e d 
Sttites J a p t i n 
A l l 
. M a n u f a c l u i 
( i n i n t r i e s ' 
I'uhn- in iiiUlioi s {)f U.S. dolhirs -
r n u p u "svirx.iom 1*6.' 
1*64 
— 1.360 
1.490 
2.500 
2 ,540 
1.02(1 
1.1170 
140 
160 
5 ,020 
5,"27n 
Ot.Tpi' r h T A ..'v.'iinlT'.'S 1*6.' 
1*64 
1.2S0 
1.530 
1.700 
2.020 
3.530 
3,830 
72(1 
800 
90 
] 30 
7.330 
8.110 
E l : i . ' :p i inLr ies 1963 
1964 
1.980 
2.280 
5.720 
6,290 
15,790 
18,390 
2.560 
2.860 
360 
390 
26 .400 
30.2 'IO 
. . T i i e u .^tates- I . 1963 
1964 
i . n o 
1.470 
860 
960 
3.970 
4 ,560 — 
1.710 
1.910 
8,380 
9.460 
Japan' 1963 
1954 
160 
200 
120 
200 
330 
.3-0 
1,520 
1,870 -
2.130 
2.630 
.Al l manulacT 'anP 'a 
aoun-.nes'- ; 1963 
1964 
4 ,590 
5 ,480 
9.750 
10.970 
26,110 
29.690 
5.820 
6 .590 
2.300 
2,590 
49.260 
55,8.70 
-Perci'nitii^c incrciiSi'S, 196.1 to 1964' ~* 
Ea. ted K ' . aocom — 10.1 1.6 5.2 14.0 5.0 
• "he- E F T A o a n t r e s 19.6 18.8 8.5 11.0 36.2 13.4 
E E C c •.•am-:es 15.1 9.9 16.4 11.5 9.5 14 4 
E- i*ea Sia tes- 25.4 12.5 15.0 — 11.8 12,9 
.'".-sn 26.9 • 73.0 10.2 22.6 — 23.5 
A ' ; .~an i i t ; i c lu r ;na 
.oun . r ies - • 19.4 12.5 13.7 13.2 12.6 13.4 
- -dr-.e- Ir . terriptinnai Vf r .ne ta r / F and and I n t e r n a t i o n a l B a n k for R e c o n s t r u c t i o n tind D e v c lopment . Direction of Trade. 
a—ause oJ -o; jn(! ina. '. '.a hpares s h o w n m a y not add to totals . 
- I'-toitrt! - i l i t i r / e-.-prr-i F i a u V-.-.. . . r v . ' r i n '.ha rar,;e res in las t cf t lumn inc lude est imate ot U . S . speci ; i l ca tegory expor t s , w h i c h c innot be a l loca ted betw 
• ^ • ' r j j e ' e d : rom - jnrpunPeh fig-j.- i . 
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Balance of payments d e f i c i t s i n Japan tend to vary inversely with 
her rate of econondc growth and her success in reconciling f u l l employ-
ment with cost and price s t a b i l i t y . Since Japan had enjoyed high levels 
of employment, a further substantial r i s e i n output was largely dependent 
on gains i n productivity i f prices were to ronain stable. I n 1963 
Japan's output had been greater than in any other i n d u s t r i a l country. 
However, the rate of advance decelerated during 1964 as the res u l t of 
measures mainly directed toward protecting the balance of payments and 
curbing the upward pressure on wages and prices. This slbwdown i s 
i l l u s t r a t e d in the following graph.*^ 
Selected Areas and Goimtries: I n d u s t r i a l 
Production, Seasonally Adjusted, 1962- A p r i l 1966 
(1958 m 100) 
350 
European i^conomic 
Ctofflmunity ; 
U. S, and 
Canada 
150 
100 
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
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However, Japanese authorities i n 1964 faced with an improved balance 
of payments position baaed on r i s i n g exports, improvement i n demand 
conditions in the home and export markets, and increasing competitiveness 
of export prices, turned to more expansionary policies i n order to im-
part a new impetus to economic expansion i n the domestic economy. 
Monetary policy was directed toward reviving economic a c t i v i t y . 
The reserve requirements for bank deposits were cut i n half and the 
43 
Bank of Japan lowered i t s discount rate from 6,57% to 5.48%, F i s c a l 
policy was alao used f a i r l y a c t i v e l y to a s s i s t the recovery. I n J u l y 
the Government expanded i t s program to include public iixorks expenditures, 
reduced interest rates on investment Hattns, lower taxes, and various 
measures for expanding exports. In f a c t , t o t a l average government 
investment from 1962-1965 amounted to 36% of GWP, the largest for any 
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country, 
' These measures to reactivate the economy did not take hold u n t i l 
late i n 1965 when production f i n a l l y began to r i s e again. Japan s t i l l 
.had a s i g n i f i c a n t margin of unutilized economic capacity at the beginning 
of 1966 and therefore, policies of expansion were continued throughout 
the year. F i s c a l policy was used to stimulate private consumption^ and 
monetary policy was kept r e l a t i v e l y easy. The index of in d u s t r i a l 
production, which had remained s t a t i c in 1965, advanced by 20% during 
1966,^ 
IJhile Japan addressed herself to stitauiation of economic a c t i v i t y , 
the United States and most other i n d u s t r i a l countries were forced to 
moderate demand expansion and decelerate economic a c t i v i t y because increasing 
strains on resources were causing i n f l a t i o n a r y prices and balance of 
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47 payments disequilibriiEn, These pressures had been brought on by 
the exceptionally strong expansion of the i r markets frora mid-ly65 
to mid-1966, during which time Japan benefited from her high dependence 
on the U.S. market, Japanese exports to the United States increased 
48 
1964 1965 1966 196/ 1968 1969 
by 35% while U.S. exports to Japan increased by only 1%, And t o t a l 
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Japanese imports increased by only 1,6%. 
There i s quite a close relation between increases i n in d u s t r i a l 
output and increases i n the value of imports. As the following table 
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I'.Di'sj RiAi roi;NTi<iF.s: GnowTH OF INDUSTRI .M O U T F I T AND G R O W T H OF IMPORTS R F L A T I V E TO G R O W T H 
OF I N U U S I K I A L O U T P U T , 1 9 6 4 - 6 5 , 1965-66 , A N D S E C O N D H A L F 1 9 6 5 - S F C O N D H A L F 1 9 6 6 
(In percentage changes) 
1964 to 1965 1965 to 1966 
Second H a l f 1965 
to Second H a l f 1966 
,1 G r o w t h o f R e l a t i v e G r o w t h o f R e l a t i v e G r o w t h o f Re la t ive 
indust r ia l g rowth o f indus t r ia l g rowth o f indust r ia l growth o f 
output 1 i m p o r t s ' .output 1 i m p o r t s ' output ' i m p o r t s ' 
511 Indus t r i a l Coun t r i e s 5 . 2 ' 3 . 5 A l l Indus t r ia l Coun t r i e s 5 .6 ' 5 .1 5.3 > 3 .9 
C o u n t r i e s of Above -Ave rage Coun t r i e s o f A b o v e - A v e r a g e 
G r t t w t h in Output front G r o w t h in Outpu t f r o m 
. 1964 to 1965 1965 to 1966 
Cant ida 8 6 J a p a n 12 5 17 .4 
Sweden 8 6 I t a ly 11 5 12 3 
Un i t ed States 8 6 U n i t e d States 9 10 9 9 
N o r w a y * 7 3 C a n a d a 8 6 6 5 
Denni . i rk 6 3 F"rance 7 7 6 8 
Oerntar iy 6 13 Nether lands 6 1 6 — 1 
Nethe t ia i ids 6 - 1 
f ( juntries of Average or Coun t r i e s o f Be low-Average 
Be low-Average f i r o w l t i in G r o w t h in Output f rom 
(Jutpi i t front 1964 to 1965 1965 to 1966 
Japai t 5 - 2 Aus t r i a 4 7 3 1 A u s t r i a 4 8 N o r w a y * 4 7 5 9 
I ta ly 4 - 3 Sweden 3 1 2 1 
S w i i / e r l ; i i t d 4 - 2 Swi t ze r l and •• 3 3 3 4 
Uni ted K i n g d o m 1 - 1 D e n m a r k t 2 4 4 5 
Be lg iu in -Luxembt tu rg 2 7 G e r m a n y 2 2 — - 1 F rance 1 2 Uni ted K i n g d o m 2 2 — 2 B e l g i u m - L u x e m b o u r g 2 S — a 
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indicates, the growth of output, and of imports r e l a t i v e to i t was high 
i n the United States and Canada as had been the case in 1964-1965, 
However i n Japan, where government authorities were seeking increased 
i n d u s t r i a l production, generally e l a s t i c supply conditions appear to 
have moderated the groi-rth of imports r e l a t i v e to output, offsetting 
the effect of any build up i n inventories of imported raw materials and 
semi-manufactures which may have increased her rate of expansion. The 
groi-rtih of imports i n Japan did not increase u n t i l 1965-1966 when the 
measures designed to activate the economy f i n a l l y took hold. 
The economy continued to expand through 1966-196/ and was a major 
exception to the general economic deceleration i n the rest of the indus-
t r i a l world due to str a i n s on available resources, Japan s t i l l had 
significant margins of unutilized economic capacity and her growth 
supported a further rapid increase in imports throughout 1967, However, 
the strong r i s i n g trends of production and imports were interrupted i n 
1968 under the iuapact of policies of r e s t r a i n t adopted by the Japanese 
authorities,^^ 
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The continued rapid growth of the Japanese economy during 1967, 
while taany of her major trading partners' economies were f a l t e r i n g , led 
to the disappearance of the current account surplus, which had reached 
$1,4 b l l l i t m i n 1966, This development prompted Japan to jo i n the 
Uhited States, Canada, and the United Kingdom who were a l l i n phases 
of r e s t r a i n t with the objective of holding down the expansion of 
aggregate demand within the l i m i t s of productive capacity and reducing 
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the pressure on domestic resources. 
To counter her emerging balance of payments d i f f i c u l t i e s , Japan 
switched from an expansionary to a contractionary f i s c a l and monetary 
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policy. The Bank of Japan raised the discount rate from 5,48% to 6,21%, 
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the Government deferred 7% of budgeted investment outlays, and domestic 
credit i n general was tightened. The tightening of credit conditions 
i n Japan pulled i n funds from the rest of the world, p a r t i c u l a r l y from 
countries of Europe i n balance of payments s u r p l u s , T h e desired 
r e s u l t was that Japanese enterprises switched to foreign financing, 
borrowing almost $1 b i l l i c m i n short-term funds largely from U.S. banks 
and on the Euro-dollar market,^ This inflow of cap i t a l made Japan's 
over-all payments position close to balance i n 1967 as i n 1966. 
Although world trade slowed down considerably i n 1966 due to the 
easing of dMoand conditions i n Europe and North America, i t increased 
approximately 12% from 1967 to 1968, the highest rate of growth on record. 
The broad expansion of world trade was accompanied by extraordinarily 
large changes i n trade balances of sane major i n d u s t r i a l countries, 
A sharp f a l l of $3.3 b i l l i o n in the U.S. trade surplus reflected 
an increase of almost 25% (compared to 7% for 1966-67) i n the growth of 
I t 
Japan's export market. Strong demand developments In the United States 
gave strong impetus to the Japanese trade position and provided an 
C D 
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important stimulus to Japan's economic growth throughout ly68. Although 
a sharp break in import expansion occurred i n the f i r s t half of 1968, 
r e f l e c t i n g the impact of the r e s t r i c t i v e f i n a n c i a l p o l i c i e s , Japan 
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recorded economic growth of 14|7o for 1968, compared with 13% for 1967. 
The high rate of growth in 1968 was accompanied by a large surplus 
on current account, which was only p a r t i a l l y offset by a net c a p i t a l 
outflow, Japan's o v e r - a l l pajmients balance, which had been small i n 
recent prior years, expanded to a record surplus of $1,2 b i l l i o n i n 1968, 
against a $130 m i l l i o n d e f i c i t i n the previous f i n a n c i a l year,*^ 
I t 
The combination of a marked strengthening of the external position 
and a pronounced increase i n the current account with such an extremely 
rapid pace of groirth was unusual and reflected several important factors. 
One of them was the prevalence of strong demand elsewhere i n the world, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the United States, which i s an important market for 
Japanese exports. I n part, too, the buoyancy of exports reflected some 
reorientation of Japanese producers toward foreign sales during late 
1967 and early 1968, when f i n a n c i a l r e s t r a i n t i n Japan dampened domestic 
demand. The resultant s h i f t i n the demand pattern was instrumental 
not only i n causing a turnaround i n the current account position but 
also i n providing stimulus for the upswing of Japanese economic a c t i v i t y . 
Another factor contributing to the strength of the current account 
was the rapid growth i n the productive capacity of Japan's exporting 
and import-competing industries in the period since the 1965 recession. 
Real output i n Japan rose at an average annual rate of more than 13% 
per annum i n the period from 1967 to 1969,*^ higher than that i n the 
United States or the United Kingdom, That expansion of productive 
capacity, along with very rapid productivity gains, helped to keep 
Japanese export prices r e l a t i v e l y stable and contributed greatly to 
the improvement of Japan's cotapetitive position i n international markets. 
I n the two years to mid-1969, Japanese economic expansion proceeded 
without endangering domestic s t a b i l i t y . However, i n the course of 1969, 
price advances began to accelerate and policies were shifted in order 
to control the rapid r i s e i n demand before inflationary expectations 
became deep rooted. With that purpose i n mind, the authorities i n t r o -
duced i n September 1969, a set of monetary measures including increases 
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in the o f f i c i a l discount rate and related interest rates, increases i n 
reserve requirements for commercial banks, and a strengthening of guide-
lines for both bank borroi-rings from the Bank of Japan and the lending 
policies of the cotmaercial banks. 
While t h i s recent emergence of stronger pressures on costs and 
prices in Japan did not immediately diminish the competitive advantage 
that she had gained i n e a r l i e r years due to the acceleration of price 
advances i n other countries, i t appeared to arrest any further widening 
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of that advantage. 
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The association of a strong current account position and pressure 
on resources made i t d i f f i c u l t for Japanese authorities to reconcile 
t h e i r doaestic and external objectives of policy. With respect to the 
balance of payments, policies designed to encourage a net outflow of 
both long-term and short-term capital had been followed. Especially 
with regard to short-terra c a p i t a l , a substantial outflow was recorded 
for 1969, owing i n part to a decrease i n foreign borroviing. The reduc-
tion i n foreigTi borrowing reflected special monetary measures taken by 
the authorities as vieW as r e l a t i v e l y low interest rates i n Japan i a 
comparison with those i n other countries. 
2X 
However, following the adoption of r e s t r i c t i v e monetary policies 
i n the f a l l of 1969 and the consequent growing shortage of domestic 
l i q u i d i t y , short-terra foreign borrowing stopped declining. I n the early 
part of 19/0, while export credit continued to expand, the inflow of 
foreign credit to finance imports increased markedly, r e f l e c t i n g a strong 
expansion of imports during the period. I n June 1970, the authorities 
C Y C L I C A L P A T T E R N OF W O R L D T R A D E : C H A N G E S I N V A L U E , 1 9 5 6 - F I R S T Q U A R T E R 1971 
' {PercehtLigc changes from preceding-six months, at annua/ rates, base,I on seasonally adjusted data) 
Six Months Ended 
I Dec. June Dec. June Dec. June Dec. June Dec. Mar. 
i 1966 1967 1967 1968 1968 1969 1969 1970 1970 1971 
World imports 9 5 4 13 1 5 1 2 1 6 1 5 1 0 LTT^ ' 
• Imoorts of industrial 
• countries 8 4 5 1 4 1 7 13 1 6 1 5 1 1 9 
Europe 4 3 4 8 1 9 1 7 1 5 1 8 1 2 10 
Japan . . . 2 0 2 4 1 6 8 1 3 8 3 2 2 3 1 9 4 
United States and 
Canada 1 6 1 6 29 1 3 7 1 4 7 5 9 
introduced new measures to provide special funds to finance imports 
with a view to preventing a further increase in foreign borrowing and 
keeping the increase i n foreign exchange reserves at a moderate pace, 
A l t h o u ^ the r e s t r i c t i v e monetary policy adopted by the authorities 
in the f a l l of 1969 was meant to control the rapid r i s e i n demand and 
prices, i t also caused the end of the economic boom that had conroenced 
late i n 1965, The slowdown i n the rate of output growth came i n 19/0 
when r e a l GUP expanded by only 1 1 % i n comparison vrith advances of 12 
to 14% in the previous three years,** Although Japan's rate of r e a l 
output growth declined through 1969 and 1970, t h i s deceleration was 
less pronounced than i n the Iftiitcd States and did not dip below the 
average for the 1960s,*^ 
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m response to the slowdown, the Bank of Japan i n late 1970 lowered 
the discount rate from 6.25% to 5.25% to reduce the rate of inflow of 
funds and ended i t s guidance over commercial bank lending. On the f i s c a l 
side, the Japanese Government increased i t s expenditures in hopes of 
stimulating the economy and i n hopes of replacing foreign financing 
of imports with domestic financing. 
The e f f e c t s of the economic slowdown were f e l t i n the foreign trade 
sector through an increase i n Japanese imports and also through export 
price increases. Although Japan's trade surplus continued to increase^, 
i t was increasing at a decreasing rat e . The increase i n exports was 
only 7,4% over 1969 as compared with 10,4% over 1968 when the upsurge 
i n world trade was dominated by a steep r i s e of Japanese imports into 
the United States.** Thereafter the primary impetus to the growth of 
world trade emanated frcHU European and Japanese import demand, 
Japan's unit labor costs increased f a i r l y sharply during 1970 but 
not enough to close the si g n i f i c a n t gap that had opened up frora 1966 
through 1969 between the Japanese trend and the generally r i s i n g trend 
of competitors* costs, Japanese export prices, unlike those of most 
in d u s t r i a l countries, apparently rose faster than manufacturers' unit 
costs i n 1970, but the Japanese competitive position was l i t t l e affected, 
owing to the almost p a r a l l e l movement of other countries' export price*.*' 
The continuation of large surpluses i n Japan's balance of payments 
was a prominant feature of the international payments situation. During 
1968 and 1969, the Japanese current account balance had strengthened 
i n contrast to the weakening that had occurred i n past periods of rapid 
econcmic growth and the over a l l balance of payments had recorded substantial 
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surpluses, A somewhat larger surplus was realized i n 19 70, when the 
current account surplus again exceeded $2 b i l l i o n and the net c a p i t a l 
outflov7 declined. Further overall surpluses, on a much higher scale, 
accrued during the f i r s t s i x months of 1971, partly because of the sharp 
slowdown in import growth associated with the sluggishhess of the 
68 
domestic economy. 
As a r e s u l t , i n June 1971, the Japanese Cabinet decided to broaden 
and in t e n s i f y e f f o r t s to achieve a better external and internal equi-
librium by means of an eight-point program. I t included " t a r i f f reductions, 
acceleration of import l i b e r a l i z a t i o n , gradual abolition of tax con-
cessions to exporters, removal of the l i m i t on outward direct investments, 
promotion of dcveloianent aid , and the f l e x i b l e operation of f i s c a l and 
monetary policies so as to remove the e f f e c t s of slack domestic demand 
on the trade surplus."*^ 
The government t r i e d to stimulate the domestic economy i n hopes of 
ending the year and a half recession—an unusually long one for Japan, 
The government also t r i e d to encourage Imports of goods and exports of 
capital to help ease her huge trade surplus. (Current estimate: about 
$5 b i l l i o n at an annual rate.^^) That, of course, i s the principal 
reason why Japan revalued the yen upward 16,88% i n December 1971. In 
theory, f a s t e r domestic growth should also curb exports, but that won't 
necessarily happen. 
Since Japan's exceedingly large trade surplus has imposed consid-
erable s t r a i n s on the world economic system, p a r t i c u l a r l y on the United 
States, i t w i l l be beneficial to take a closer look at Japanese foreign 
trade. 
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JAPANESE FOREIGN TRADE 
Japan has become a favorite target of those Americans who choose 
to look beyond U.S. borders to place blame for our problems in world 
trade. They prefer to regard Japan as a v i l l a i n rather than simply 
ambitious; as a super exporter rather than a great consimier; and as a 
potential destroyer of U.S. industry rather than a great potential 
market, 
Harold B, Scott, assistant secretary of commerce for domestic and 
international business, commented, "There i s a tendency to pick on 
Japan as a whipping boy /sincq/ Japan has merely exploited with greater 
success than anyone else our gracing v u l n e r a b i l i t y . " ' ^ 
One factor—productivity—accounts for much of Japan's a b i l i t y to 
exploit U.S. v u l n e r a b i l i t y . In 1970 alone, exports from Japan to the 
United States rose by 20%.''^ Japanese productivity increases are by far 
the largest i n the world, whereas the United States i s improving i t s 
productivity more slowly than any other i n d u s t r i a l nation. The f o l -
lowing graph'-^ i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s f a c t . 
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Labor productivity i s the single most important reason for Japanese 
success. Cited Japanese productivity gains were 
9.5% annually for 1956-1960 
7.7% annually for 1961-1965 
14,7% annually for 1966-1970 
However, when we look at Japan in r e a l i t y i t has two economies—a very 
advanced large-scale production economy and a r e l a t i v e l y backward econany 
of small-scale production and r e t a i l shops. So that labor productivity 
increases were considerably higher than 14,7% among the modern plants. 
On the other hand, productivity i n the United States increased at 
an annual rate of l i t t l e more than 2% through the 1960s—and less than 
2% a year through the second half of that decade,'^ The graph on the 
following page,'* i l l u s t r a t e s Japan's remarkable growth of i n d u s t r i a l 
output as compared to that of the United States, 
Fueling Japan's productivity growth and her trade policy has been 
the world's highest l e v e l of investment i n new plant and equipment, 
Japanese investment through the '608 was about 33% of OSIP with the 
U,S, rate of 167<, among the lowest for i n d u s t r i a l c o i m t r i e s , " I n 
cotimkentlng on U.S. investment with regard to obsolescense of plant and 
equipment, Mr. Peter G, Peterson, the former Executive Director of the 
Council on International Sconomic Policy, stated: 
We found i n our work l a s t year that the age of United States' 
i n d u s t r i a l plant and equipment was roughly twice that of some of 
our major competitors. There i s evidence that nearly 707o of 
Japan's machine tools are less than 10 years old. Only 35% of 
ours are less than 10 years old. And Japan's rate of investment 
has been twice ours for the period 1968-70,'^ 
This difference i n investment levels i s partly a r e s u l t of another 
difference. I n Japan, industry, labor, and government have a strong 
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sense of national purpose and ate united i n a drive for common goals; 
whereas, i n the United States, adversary relationships dominate i n t e r -
action among the three sectors. 
This same attitude c a r r i e s over into labor i n the way Japanese 
workers do their jobs. Labor welcomes increasingly automated equip-
ment. In f a c t , Japanese workers are dismayed by the resistance of U.S. 
workers to automation. The Japanese regard more e f f i c i e n t tools 
merely as a way to increase production, decrease costs, and thereby 
increase sales. They see r e s t r i c t i v e work rul e s , long s t r i k e s , and 
workers doing less than they arc capable of doing as detrimental to 
th e i r companies. And they are guided by the long-term view that what 
i s detrimental to the company eventually w i l l be detrimental to the 
worker. Contributing to t h i s labor atmosphere i s the fact that regular 
wages represent only about half of t o t a l pay—the rest caning i n the 
form of semi-annual bonuses. "Nbthing must interfere with the bonus,"'' 
Levels of individual productiveness that r e s u l t from t h i s s p i r i t 
contribute about as much as the high levels of investment to Japan's 
high rates of productivity increases—and to Japan's great success i n 
the world market. 
This success has resulted i n several misconceptions about the 
Japanese, One of these i s that Japan's industry i s strongly directed 
toward flooding the res t of the world, p a r t i c u l a r l y the United States, 
with transistor radios, small cars, and a v a r i e t y of other products. 
Quick appraisals of Japanese export increases might lead to t h i s 
conclusion, but the hard figures refute i t , Armin Meyer, former 
Ambassador to Japan, said: "A review of Japan's performance during the 
28 
l a s t decade leads to the conclusion that, rather than being export-led, 
i t s economic expansion has been based primarily upon intensive domestic 
investment i n plant and equipment which created a rapidly expanding 
on 
domestic market," Japan's exports and imports as percentages of OJP, 
which approached the $200 b i l l i o n mark for 19/0, are quite low—one 
Of Japan's strengths i s i t s low reliance on foreign trade. For Japan 
exports represent about 97o of GNP, compared with 15 to 337o for the United 
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Kingdom, West Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden, 
During the extended investment boom i n Japan, plant and equipmient 
investment i n manufacturing accounted for up to 65% and occasionally 
more of t o t a l private investment. Now t h i s r a t i o has declined to 50%, 
and no Japanese economist i n government or out of i t presently expects 
t h i s r a t i o of 50-50 to change much over the next several years. I f 
these forecasts are confirmed, a somewhat slower rate of economic growth 
can be expected which would cause a decline i n the r a t i o of exports to 
GNP, The annual rate of increase of exports could s e t t l e within a 
range of 10 to 15%, compared to l / , l 7 e for the 1960s as a whole and the 
22.8% from 1968 to 19/0,*^ A l t h o u ^ the s t a t i s t i c s indicate that Japan 
i s not the export-dominated nation i t ' s often thought to be, the Japanese 
export/GNP r a t i o i s more than double that of the United States.** The 
largest single item giving Japan a trade surplus with the United States 
l a s t year was automobile exports,^* As a r e s u l t , the United States 
now takes one-third of Japan's exports of autos, one-half of i t s radio 
and electronic-calculator exports, and almost a l l of i t s color TV 
exports,** 
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While U.S. exports to Japan increased more than three-fold. 
American imports frora Japan during the *608 increased at an even 
greater r a t e . 
Value, i n $ b i l l i o n 
1960 1965 196/ 19/0 
% inc. 
1960-70 
Total Two-way Trade 
U.S. Exports to Japan 
U.S. Imports from Japan 
$2.6 $4.5 $6.0 $10,5 
1.4 2,1 3,0 4,7 
1,1 2,4 3,0 5,9 
306% 
222 
412 
As 8 r e s u l t , the balance of trade, heavily i n the U.S. favor during the 
1950s f i r s t dj^rindled, and then turned i n 1964. Since then, Japan's 
trade surplus has mounted almost every year. Our iraports from Japan 
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exceeded American exports to that country by over $3 b i l l i o n in 1971, 
Japan's import-export r a t i o i s somewhat distorted by Japanese 
a f f i l i a t e s of U.S. companies which have made a sort of c a p i t a l f l i g h t 
getting r i d of U.S. labor which priced i t s e l f f a r beyond the j u s t i f i a b l e 
l e v e l . These a f f i l i a t e s are s e l l i n g $4 b i l l i o n of t h e i r products in 
Japan each year, A large proportion of that amount might have been 
imported frora the United States i f U.S. companies had not had operations 
in Japan, Figures also add that exports to the United States from the 
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms rose at an annual rate of 217» during 
the f i v e years ended with 1968,^8 
And so Japan continues to flood the world with exports of low 
price and high quality, earning i t s e l f the grudging admiration of 
competitors but also upsetting world markets and aggravating the U.S. 
balance of payments. The following section of t h i s paper seeks to 
look at the factors that have put Japan ahead i n the great race for 
economic growth. 
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THE mm FACTORS IN JAPAN'S B30N0MIG GROimi 
The factors that produced or sped up Japan's economic growth are 
nimerous, very complicated in th e i r operation, and not yet f u l l y 
agreed upon by economists. I n addition, often the favorable factors 
of growth have to be operating i n appropriate combinations before they 
can produce favorable r e s u l t s . A l l the same, a study of the remarkable 
Japanese economic success story must contribute to understanding some 
key factors in economic growth. 
Putting Available Resources to Work 
Even as la t e as 1949, E. A, Ackerman, an economic geographer on 
the s t a f f of the Ataerican occupation authorities wrote: 
I n the l i g h t of an analysis of i t s resources, the Japan of the 
next three decades appears to have one of two aspects i f i t s 
population continues to grow to 100 m i l l i o n or morei 
1, I t may have a standard of l i v i n g equivalent to that of 
1930-34 i f foreign f i n a n c i a l assistance i s continued 
i n d e f i n i t e l y . 
2, I t may be "self-supporting", but with internal p o l i t i c a l , 
economic and s o c i a l d i s t r e s s , and a standard of l i v i n g 
gradually approaching the bare subsistence l e v e l . 
Twenty years l a t e r , supporting a population just over 100 m i l l i o n , 
Japan's GNP has become the second largest i n the non-Communist world. 
Geographers have usually turned the fact that Japan i s extremely 
short of raw materials into a disadvantage. The Japanese have turned 
t h i s lack of domestic sources to t h e i r advantage, because Japanese 
industry i s not compelled to buy expensive and/or i n f e r i o r domestic 
materials but can buy from the cheapest source in the whole world. 
Another Japanese limitation i s an extreme shortage of land, 
especially f l a t land. As a r e s u l t , heavy industry often had to be 
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located over reclaimed sea area. This location of industry, plus the 
fact that the vast majority of raw materials are imported have been 
turned to an advantage by building specialized giant ships (which 
reduce the cost of transport) and by unloading coal and iron ore 
d i r e c t l y from the ships into the blast furnaces (which reduces handling 
cos t s ) . 
The Importance of Structural Change i n the Economy 
Although the Japanese "economic miracle" has been produced partly 
by the mass of Japanese workers learning to do t h e i r jobs better, the 
biggest source of growth has been in a continuing, conscious, and delib-
erate structural change of the economy. I n other words, factors of 
production have been moved out of unprofitable and unpromising industries 
into industries that promised greater returns. 
I n Japan, agriculture wqs for a long time the very basis of growth 
and the source of resources for growth i n other sectors. Then str u c t -
u r a l change was aimed at labor intensive industries—^which was sound 
because the country had plenty of labor—and there came the development 
of light consumer-goods industries, especially t e x t i l e s , to be followed 
by a stress on simpler heavy industries. I n the present stage, aimed 
at s k i l l e d labor and labor intensive industries, entry has been made 
into the most sophisticated modern gadget industries and the chemical 
industry. 
I t i s obvious that s h i f t i n g millions of workers i n the post-war 
period from low-wage (and i n Japan unprofitable) agriculture, or from 
small r e t a i l e r and small manufacturer sectors into high wage modern 
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profitable industries, produced large increases of OJP without the 
necessity for working harder, or without people necessarily working 
with any greater o r i g i n a l i t y or intelligence. This f a c t , however, 
should not be allowed to minimize Japan's extraordinary achievement. 
Having a large i n e f f i c i e n t sector in the economy i s not a s u f f i c i e n t 
condition for economic growth. The crux of the problem l i e s i n the fact 
that the larger the I n e f f i c i e n t sector i n the economy, the greater the 
i n e r t i a of that economy, and the harder the task of performing the 
structural s h i f t . ' 
The Role of Education 
After World War I I , Japan single-mindedly adopted the principle: 
"Economic Growth F i r s t " , The mobilization of the national e f f o r t f o r 
development was aided by the early and rapid introduction of univer-
s a l education. 
Before the 20th century began, l i t e r a c y in Japan was almost 100%. 
Japan was, i n f a c t , among the pioneers of universal compulsory education, 
Injorder the better to use the schools to breed p a t r i o t i c c i t i z e n s , the 
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Government assumed a monopoly over textbook manufacture i n 1903, The 
res u l t was an almost t o t a l uniformity of education experience in the f i r s t 
s i x school years of the l i f e of every Japanese c h i l d . This homogeneity 
of popular i n t e l l e c t u a l culture preserved and strengthened Japanese 
nationalism to such an extent^that the Westernization of Japanese 
i n t e l l e c t u a l and c u l t u r a l l i f e i n the post-war period had the paradox-
i c a l e f f e c t of heightening the Japanese' sense of t h e i r separateness. 
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Education i s highly prized i n Japan, and Japanese parents arc 
prepared to make great f i n a n c i a l s a c r i f i c e s to obtain admission to a 
university for t h e i r children, A university degree i s now essential 
for most white-collar jobs, and i t i s not uncomnon for factory foremen 
to have university degrees. 
The Importance of Exports and the Plow of Foreign Exchange 
The development of a backward country requires a substantial flow 
of foreign exchange for the purchase of foreign capital equipment and 
expertise which caiuiot be obtained at home. This means that unless 
there i s a p o s s i b i l i t y of substantial foreign borrowing and aid, the 
developing country must develop a healthy and l i v e l y export industry. 
With the development of export trade, much of the increased outnut of 
the rapidly developing country w i l l be sold abroad and w i l l act as a 
growth stimulant i n the backward economy. I f , however, they must be 
sold as consianer goods in the domestic market, t h i s implies that a l l , 
or almost a l l , of the income i s consumed at home, and saving and invest-
ment w i l l be low. This would undermine the whole basis of development. 
I f , on the other hand, saving i s maintained at a high l e v e l , i f there 
i s no attempt to consume the bulk of the increase in output, and the 
increased output i s not sold abroad, t h i s would constitute a serious 
drag on growth and a c t i v i t y . 
There i s an additional reason why a healthy and growing export 
market i s v i t a l for development. A small domestic market in an under-
developed country does not allow the development of large scale pro-
duction with i t s important economies of scale. But i f the developing 
country can find a substantial market abroad either because of sheer 
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luck or through i t s own e f f o r t s to create an export industry, i t cannot 
help growing. For any single country the world market i s so large 
that i t w i l l take increasing quantities of output without the necessity 
of lowering price. 
The Role of Foreign Capital 
Japan, i n spite of her meager natural endowment, has been quite 
fortunate i n respect to foreign trade and foreign exchange a v a i l a b i l i t y 
although she has borrowed very l i t t l e and permitted very l i t t l e foreign 
investment at home. To t h i s day she retains a very strong d i s i n c l i n a t i o n 
to l e t in foreign investment, i n spite of the equally strong present 
diplomatic pressure by the United States to allow more foreign c a p i t a l 
investment i n Japan. In f a c t , one can say that the Japanese economic 
growth miracle has been performed v i r t u a l l y without foreign c a p i t a l . 
The main reasons for t h i s are very strong Japanese nationalism and fear 
of foreign economic and p o l i t i c a l domination. 
Active Policy of Importing Foreign Know-How 
Since World War I I , mainly during the iieriod of the American 
occupation, Japan has received sane direct private investment i n 
modern i n d u s t r i e s — q u a n t i t a t i v e l y unimportant, but very important 
q u a l i t a t i v e l y because i t was the vehicle of spreading know-how and 
modern technology. "Since 1949, when the Government introduced a 
system for a s s i s t i n g introduction of foreign know-how and u n t i l the 
beginning of 1969, Japanese industry signed 9,856 contracts with the 
advanced comtries"^'^ for the purchase of foreign technology i n a 
vast range of industries, such as petro-chemicals, synthetic r e s i n s . 
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synthetic f i b e r s , electronics, atomic energy, automation technology, 
motor cars, and many others. 
Japan A Creditor Country Again 
In recent years Japan has emerged from the status of a net debtor 
coimtry into being a net creditor, Frora nov; on Japan's creditor 
status w i l l grow steadily, barring any r e a l l y extraordinary developments 
i n the world. This w i l l be so for three separate reasons: 
1) F i r s t , owing to the remarkable competitiveness of Japanese 
products i n the world markets (evidence of the underval-
uation of the yen), the Japanese share of world trade i s 
growing very f a s t , and her balance of pajr^nts i s very 
healthy. As a r e s u l t , the Japanese Goveriunent w i l l very 
l i k e l y e a s i l y give approvals for investment abroad and may 
even encourage i t i n order to disarm international pressures 
on Japan for l i b e r a l i z a t i o n of import barriers and/or for 
further upward revaluation of the yen because large overseas 
investment w i l l tend to prevent foreign currency reserves 
from growing excessively. 
2) The second reason why Japan i s l i k e l y to increase her 
foreign investment abroad i s rapid growth from now on of 
the motive—domestic know-how. Export of cap i t a l usually 
has as a vehicle Mid as an engine some form of superior 
know-how. 
3) Another reason l i e s in the fact that such foreign investment 
confers several indirect benefits on Japan or Japanese firms, 
apart frora the obvious direct benefit i n the form of a 
dividend, Japanese foreign investment, l i k e any investment 
abroad, can have the following indirect e f f e c t s : 
a) Investment made for the purpose of u t i l i z i n g local 
(foreign) resources may increase exports of Japanese 
capital equipment and parts for the finished product, 
especially where under-developed countries are involved, 
b) I n d u s t r i a l investment made abroad under the protective 
trade b a r r i e r s of the coimtry in question may be an 
effe c t i v e means of beating competition of other countries 
i n that market. 
c) Some investments abroad are made to f a c i l i t a t e marketing, 
sueh as dis t r i b u t i o n agencies and servicing or repair agencies. 
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d) Because Japanese industry and government are very 
conscious of their dependence on foreign supplies of 
essential raw materials, they have developed a remarkable 
policy of investing i n foreign extractive industries. 
By offering different supplier countries long-term 
contracts and by putting some cap i t a l into the extraction 
venture the Japanese stimulate price undercutting and 
competition among the supplying countries and stimulate 
an increase in the world capacity of the particular 
raining industries. This must bring down the prices of 
the raw materials—which i s to the advantage of Japan— 
ft O 
i t improves her terms of trade, 
The fac t that Japanese investment policy i s designed both to 
protect sources of supply and to expand export markets for Japanese 
products i s reflected in the v a r i e t y of her investments. To obtain 
access to import sources, Japan has invested i n "forest land i n Alaska, 
o i l - d r i l l i n g s i t e s in Saudi Arabia, copper mires in Canada, Peru, and 
the Philippines, iron ore s i t e s i n Malaysia and Chile and coal mines 
i n A u s t r a l i a , " ^ * To guard against the threat of r e s t r i c t i o n s on 
Japanese exports, Japan has established "manufacturing plants i n low-
wage countries, such as auto-assembly plants i n Thailand, Mexico, and 
B r a z i l and t e x t i l e m i l l s i n Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, 
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and B r a z i l , " I n f a c t , Japan now records the world's highest lev e l 
of investment i n new plant and equipment. The Importance of S i l k 
S i l k , which dominated Japan's trade i n the pre-World XJar I I period, 
was a good foreign exchange earner for Japan since European s i l k pro-
duction was greatly reduced by silkworm disease. After World War I I , 
when nylon was developed, Japan was already geared for the develop-
ment of t e x t i l e manufacturing. Few other courAries with low wage 
labor were technologically geared to create e f f e c t i v e competition.^* 
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The i n d u s t r i a l Stagnation i n Asia 
Japanese trade also benefited from the under-developed conditions 
i n most of the poorer countries of Asia, I f these countries had not 
been i n such a low stage of technological development, they would 
have been pushing t h e i r own exports, similar to those of Japan, and 
would have seriously cut i n on Japan's growing trade surplus, 
IMdervaluation of the Yen 
Following World War I I , Japan had the advantage of undervaluation 
of the yen which gave a stimulus to exports (made them less expensive 
in foreign markets) and thereby to domestic expansion, d i r e c t l y and 
in d i r e c t l y . Usually, a surplus i n the balance of payments created by 
an undervaluation of the currency creates domestic inflationary pressures. 
However, as long as there i s some unemployed manpower to absorb, and 
wage rates are held down by some means or other, and consumption i s 
held do\m by socia l forces or f i s c a l policies as the t o t a l of incomes 
goes up, the undervaluation of the currency call be maintained. I n 
such a case the increases in export receipts can be used for importing 
producer goods for increased investment instead of resulting in i n -
creased wage rates. 
Japan has been able to maintain an undervaluation of her currency 
in the post-war period, becaust^ much of the present exports are not 
labor intensive but c a p i t a l intensive and come frora industries with 
large economies of scale and f a s t technological progress. Consequently, 
the inflationary oressures that appeared in the mid-sixties did not 
affect the export prices. However, since the spring of 1969 a sharp 
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r i s e of prices and wages has caused export prices to increase (see 
graph p. 21), This was the f i r s t time since World War I I that r e s t r i c -
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t i v e policies had to be taken for purely domestic considerations. 
Capital Formation 
Economic progress i s closely connected with the rate of c a p i t a l 
formation. I n Japan, the rate of capital formation has been high 
because the incentives to invest i n newly-produced c a p i t a l assets have 
been sustained at a high l e v e l . Since World War, eversrthing has been 
subordinated to economic growth. Not many developing countries pursue 
the objective of economic growth with the same devotion and single-
mindedness. I n that single-mindedness, the economic drive of the 
national leadership has been met by the f u l l e s t cooperation of the 
whole population. I t i s only since the Social and Economic Develoixnent 
Plan 1967-1971, that public amenities, distribution of incomes, welfare 
e f f e c t s of public finance, etc. are receiving some attention. 
U.S.-Japan Security Treaty 
Another reason why Japan has been able to single-mindedly pursue 
the objective of economic growth i s that she has not had to devote her 
resources to the maintenance of a large Japanese araed forces. Under 
the American m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l umbrella, Japan has managed to take 
a great leap forward into world economic leadership, while being content 
to look l i k e a p o l i t i c a l nonentity. The peace treaty i s saving Japan 
very large sums of money every year in defense expenditures, and in 
t h i s atomic age she i s defended even better than i f she r e l i e d solely 
on her own expensive forces. I n addition, although she i s an a l l y of 
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the United States, she has been exempted from a l l the burdens of the 
involvement i n the Korean and Vietnam wars. 
High Saving Ratio 
Since Japan has raised herself by her own boot-straps, i t i s 
clear that the Japanese have made a tremendous saving e f f o r t . They 
provided out of their unconsumed, often meager, inccnes, a l l the r e -
sources needed for the development of the coimtry. The Japanese were 
able to save a great deal when they were very poor, and now that they 
are beccmiing prosperous they are saving a higher percentage of income 
than any other nation. The average rate of saving reached a le v e l in 
98 
excess of 307o ip 196Q . I n the s i x t i e s , gross savings i n Japan rose 
to nearly hO% of OIP, of which 50% was by companies, 30% personal, 
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and 20% by the government. This fa c t i s sometimes explained by an 
adjective: the Japanese are very t h r i f t y . Furthermore, the Japanese 
are f r u g a l . 
Factors inducing the Japanese to save so much are 
— a n inadequate soci a l security system, 
—consumption lag i n a rapidly growing economy, 
— t h e housing shortage and absolute shortage of housing land, 
— t h e wage system with a substantial bonus payment once or twice a 
year, which i s l i k e l y to be saved sinde i t comes at the end of the period, 
— a n increasing share of property income accruing to the higher income 
group which has a higher saving r a t i o . 
One could add to t h i s the under-developed state of consumer cre d i t , 
and the increasing stress put on university education i n the post-war 
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period, which has been forcing parents to save more and more for the 
high educational costs. 
The Government-Business Relatlohship 
Japan's unparalleled rate of economic growth has been f a c i l i t a t e d 
by m almost unique relationship between business and government i n 
that country. The business community has a high respect for the 
intelligence, education, and general expertise of the Japanese Economic 
Planning Agency personnel. Thus, advice coming from the national plan 
adopted by the government conaaands respect and attention, though not 
necessarily compliance by the business coianunity. Generally, where 
the plan coincides with private interest i t w i l l be followed, but i f 
i t goes against private interest i t may be ignored unless the business 
community i s very public-spirited. I t i s a fact that the Japanese 
business community, l i k e the average Japanese, i s extremely ccmscioua 
of i t s obligations to the country, so that I t w i l l often follow a course 
of action that would not maximize private gain, but there are li m i t s 
to t h i s . The important fact i s that, on the whole, the Japanese plans 
prescribe a course of action for the business world that i s in their 
long-run int e r e s t . 
I t i s a s t r i k i n g feature of the Japanese economy that the export 
surplus has increased rapidly t^hile domestic demand has also grown 
substantially. Indeed there i s some controversy about the matter, and 
the following section of t h i s paper seeks to investigate the importance 
of the export market versus the importance of the domestie mdrket. 
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EXPORT- OR D0ME3T1C-0RIENTKD ROONOMIC GROimi 
Japan i s s t i l l the only developed nation i n Asia possessed of one 
of the largest and fastest growing economies in the world. This ex t r a -
ordinary record was dramatized when in 1968 Japan moved ahead of Xi?est 
(jcrmany into t h i r d place in the international growth league, with 
a gross national product (at curretnt prices) of $142 b i l l i o n , ^ * * 
Only the United States, and the Soviet Ikiion nov; produce a greater value 
of goods and services than Japan, I n 19/0, Japan's GNP, which grew to 
nearly $200 b i l l i o n , was s t i l l about one-fifth that of the United 
States and something l e s s than a half as large as the Soviet Union's, 
But i j i terms of rate of growth, Japan forged ahead i n s t r i k i n g fashion 
during the 1960s, outranking any other major i n d u s t r i a l nation as 
indicated by the following table:''•^^ 
While exports have contributed to Japan's economic growth, sub-
s t a n t i a l l y so i n some instances, their importance has often been over-
emphasized i n t h i s connection. Indeed, Japan's dependence on exports, 
while greater than i n the case of the United States, i s a good deal 
le s s than that of many other nations as indicated i n the table on 
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the following page. 
GMP at Constant Prices 
Average Annual Increase 
1950-60 1960-70 
Japan 
West Germany ., 
France 
Itoited Kingdom 
I t a l y ........ 
United States , 
9.1% 
7,9 
4,5 
2,8 
5.6 
3,2 
11,3% 
4,7 
5,6 
2,7 
5,7 
4.2 
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Exports, 1969 
Value ($ b i l l i o n ) As % of 
united States $3/.4 4.0% 
Japan 16.0 9.6 
France 15.0 11.5 
United Kingdom 1/.5 16.0 
West Germany 29,1 19.2 
Canada 14,3 19,8 
Belgium 10,0 44.1 
I t i s quite obvious tbat fast economic grOtTth goes together with 
a l i v e l y export performance; however, the opposing school of thought 
must also be given some attention, W. W. Lockwood, author of the 
book. The Econaaic Development of Japan; Growth and Structural Change, 
concludes that although "...the fortunes of the export trade made the 
difference between prosperity and depression i n Japan... i t was i n the 
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domestic market that was 'the chief stimulus to growth'," He points 
out that Japan was dependent on export markets before World War I I , but 
since l^orld War IX her growth has been fed by the emergence of a mass 
consumption society i n Japan. 
The Japanese have always had a sense of national ccxnmunity because 
they tended to remain isolated from Western contacts; and the Westerni-
sation of Japanese i n t e l l e c t u a l and c u l t u r a l l i f e had the paradoxical 
effect of heightening the Japanese sense of t h e i r separateness. Their 
increased contact with things foreign served to enhance th e i r aware-
ness of their n a t i o n a l i ty. 
The assimilation of Western material culture has followed a simi-
l a r pattern. The label 'Western' i s s t i l l firmly attached to most 
importations. Houses nave rooms and 'Western' rooms; one wears a kinuma 
or 'Western* clothes; one has r i c e with one's nteals or eats 'Western' 
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food, "This persistence of valued t r a d i t i o n a l elements helped to 
foster national consciousness i n two senses: by Serving as symbols 
of pride i n national t r a d i t i o n s , and by keeping a l i v e a sense of a l i e n -
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ness even of f u l l y assimilated Western importations." 
Aroimd 1960, the awareness began to spread among the Japanese that 
t h e i r economy was expanding at a fa s t e r rate than that of any other 
in d u s t r i a l country. Favorable foreign appraisals of Japan's economic 
performance were given prominent attention and have provided the basis 
for a new sense of national p r i d e — i n the superior ingenuity and dyna-
mism of Japanese businessmen, i n the success of Government planning, 
and in the energy and s k i l l of Japanese workers. I t also provided a 
new objective: to keep Japan ahead in the growth-rat,e stakes; to 
produce more and more transistorised t e l e v i s i o n sets and racing motor-
bikes to evoke the admiration of the outside world. 
Tliis sense of nationalism has produced a mass consumption society 
in Japan. Paradoxically, a nation of unparalleled savers has also be-
come one with a high propensity to consume. The Japanese speak of a 
"consumption revolution," The three C's—color TV, a i r conditioner, 
and car have become the goal of almost every Japanese family.'^^* 
Although i n income per capita Japan ranks only f i f t e e n t h among the na-
tions 6f the world (U.3, $188/ i n the Japanese F i s c a l Year ending 31 
March 19/0)^** she i s i n some ways extremely modern. Indeed she i s 
almost completely up-to-date in the ownership of a l l new i n d u s t r i a l 
gadgets as the table^*^' on the following page indicates. By 19/0, 
more than 90% of households in Japan owned at least one TV set, washing 
machine, and refr i g e r a t o r , ^ * ^ and as of December 1972, t h r e e - f i f t h s of 
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Diffusion Rate of Constaaer Durables i n Japan, 
per 100 Households, as of February, 1969. 
Sewing Machines 84.6 Refrigerators 84,6 
Knitting Machines 37,2 E l e c t r i c Fans 80,1 
Black and k-Jhite TV 94.7 Air-conditioners 4.9 
Color TV 13,9 ^ Organs 18,0 
Stereo Record Players 27,3 Pianos 6,1 
Tape Recorders 28,6 Passenger Cars 17,3 
Cameras 62,7 Vans 9.8 
Washing Machines 88,3 Small Trucks 6.9 
Vacuum Gleaners 62,6 
Japanese households now own a color T V . T h e acquisition of these 
and other consumer durables accelerated rapidly during the 1960s and 
brought on the "consumption revolution." 
To investigate whether Japan's economic growth has been based 
on a growing export surplus or on private domestic consumption, I 
collected United Nations' data over the period 1953-1968 in the areas 
of Gross National Product, Exports, and Private Consumption Expenditures, 
While primarily interested i n these areas, I also collected data Over 
the same period on Imports and Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation 
since these areas are also of v i t a l interest in examining Japan's 
economic growth. 
The data and the graphs made from them follow on the succeeding 
pages. Each graph follows the same basic exponential curve, and i n 
each case the upsurge occurs during the 1960s, 
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DATA 11* 
Cthousand million yen) (at current market prices) 
Year 
• 
! Expenditure 
' on 
Gross 
1 National 
1 Product 
Export s 
of 
Goods 
and 
Services 
• 1 
Imports f Private 
of 
Goods \n 
and I 
Services ! Expenditure 
Gross 
Domestic 
Fixed 
Capital 
Formation 
1953 7055 724 849 4665 1549 
1955 8624 921 872 5529 1704 
1958 11522 1270 1104 7057 2940 
1960 I54y9 1715 1638 8823 4682 
1961 19125 1/95 2096 10106 6370 
1962 21199 20 70 2027 11/46 7136 
1963 24464 2270 246 7 13768 78/5 
1964 28838 2802 1 2851 15945 9404 
1965 \/ 3452 2987 17929 9767 
1966 36544 4033 I 3435 20335 11344 
1967 43095 4315 4213 23117 13965 
1968 5107/ 5353 4763 26682 17242 
• 
4$ 
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Procedure: Next, 1 set up four correlations to test whether— 
(1) there i s a s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t correlation between 
the amount of GNP and expanding exports, 
(2) there i s a s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t correlation between 
the amount of GNP and private consumption expenditures, 
(3) there i s a s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t correlation betweert 
the amount of GNP and expanding imports, 
(4) there i s a s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t correlation between 
the amount of GNP and gross domestic fixed c a p i t a l formation. 
Calculations ( i n ten thousand m i l l i o n yen): 
(1) where X = QiP, and Y » Exports 
X = 2490,3333 Y" 25b 
EX^ = 95,550,946 I Y ^ = 1,018,y28 
EXY a 9,853,322 n «= 12 
r « ,9939 
(2) where X = GNP, and Y = Private Consumption Expenditure 
X o 2490.3333 Y = 1381,0833 
TX^ = 95,550,946 Z Y^  » 28,458,/3l 
HXY a 52,105,012 n a 12 
r a ,9985 
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(3) where X = GNP, and Y = 
X = 2490,3333 
EX"^ = 95,550,946 
TXY = 9,225,982 
r = ,99/2 
(4) where X » GNP, and Y = 
X = 2490,3333 
E x 2 o 95.550,946 
E x Y a 30,76/,508 
r = .9968 
Imports 
Y = 244,1833 
EY2 a 892,562 
n a 12 
Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation 
Y a 783,166/ 
EY2 a 9,942,764 
n a 12 
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Conclusion 
My findings could not be more obvious. I n each case 1 found a 
nearly perfect correlation between the two parameters I tested. My 
findings seem as improbable as Japan's f a n t a s t i c rate of economic 
growth, but perhaps these correlations can help explain t h i s phenomen-
a l growth. 
My study b a s i c a l l y shows that exports, imports, consumption, and 
investment have kept pace with each other to provide both the f u e l and 
the spark to ignite the f u e l i n the engine of economic growth. As 
with a l l correlations, s t a t i s t i c s w i l l never answer the question of 
which way the causal relationship goes. Do high exports promote high 
economic growth rates or the other way arouiid, or do they promote each 
other, or are they both independent of each other but promoted by a 
t h i r d factor such as private consumption. Or does high private consumption 
promote high economic growth rates or the other way awound, or do they 
promote each other, or are they both independent of each other but 
promoted by other factors such as expanding imports and increasing 
c a p i t a l investment? > " , 
Let us suppose that in fact the f a s t economic growth was export-
led or export-oriented. Does i t not follow that the very fa s t economic 
growth of the Japanese economy produced by that export explosion having 
produced large domestic income and therefore purchasing power, would 
ultimately have to make the newly domestic market the main source of 
effective demand? 
In any case, the Japanese economic growth, however led, was success-
f u l , and has moved Japan into a new era of international relations. 
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NSW ERA OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS • 
I t used to be that the Japanese looked upon the United States as 
a big brother—someone who watched over thera, VJe are the ones who 
occupied Japan at the end of World War I I and helped set her on her 
feet again. And we are the ones who for the past twenty-eight years 
have provided t h i s country with a protective s h i e l d — t h e so-called 
"nuclear umbrella"---t/hich has enabled her to devote herself to econ-
omic buildup. 
However, Japan's security has attained a stage i n t h i s new era 
where i t depends more on the power of i t s industry and continued a v a i l -
a b i l i t y of i t s technical and trading genius than i t does on an American 
atomic umbrella or potential Japanese army, Japan's GNP today i s such 
that Japanese businessmen are rapidly taking over markets i n a way the 
generals who preached a greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere never 
imagined. 
The United States recreated Japan i n i t s own image, but sooner 
or later everyone knew she would have to break away. Many Japanese 
f e e l the time has f i n a l l y come. Says one American o f f i c i a l : "They 
are not yet ready to p u l l away from us completely, but the old passive 
reliance i s surely going. They are looking for a new direction, and a 
far more active image than they've had in recent years. 
I t t s ju s t such an image that Kakuei Tanaka offered Japan, when 
eight months ago he became Japan's Prime Minister, At 54, the stocky, 
muscular, gravel-voiced Tanaka i s the youngest man to rule Japan in the 
post-war era. Besides, unlike h i s predecessors, who were university-
trained, polished diplomats, Mr. Tanaka has had only a grade-school 
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education, and though he's more American in behavior and outlook than 
any previous Premier of Japan, he's his own man. ' 
He i s frank to admit that the Japanese were stunned by the Nixon 
shocks of 1971—the 10% import surcharge on Japanese products and the 
ra d i c a l change i n American policy toward China, a change made without 
f i r s t notifying the Japanese. However, he expects Japan to maintain 
fr i e n d l y relations with the United States, but no longer as the obedi-
ent, unquestioning follower i t once was. Japan and the United States 
are entering a new relationship, one in which they are i n many ways 
equal partners. -
Hawaii Summit Talks 
This new status that Japan fias achieved was p a r t i c u l a r l y evident 
at the August 1972 Hawaii summit t a l k s between President Nixon and the 
Japanese Prime Minister, The summit produced a short-term $1,1 b i l l i c m 
agreement to ease America's acute trade imbalance. The emergency pact 
w i l l put a dent in the current $3,8 b i l l i o n annual d e f i c i t the United 
States runs up i n trade with Japan. Nixon said h i s government w i l l 
urge U.S. firms to expand the volume of exports through increased pro-
ductivity and improved market research to Japan. And Tanaka said the 
government of Japan intends to reduce the imbalance to a more manage-
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able size within a reasonable period of time. 
Key elements of the trade package worked out between the two 
countries were 
—Japanese a i r l i n e companies w i l l purchase, with the aid of 
the Tanaka government, $320 million worth of a i r c r a f t , including 
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wide-bodied "airbuses" during the next 20 months, 
—Japanese power companies w i l l purchase during an unspecified 
future period $320 m i l l i o n i n "uraniom enrichment services" from 
the United States. ' 
—Japan w i l l buy $20 m i l l i o n i n helicopters and aviation-re-
lated f a c i l i t i e s "subject to budgetary appropriation," 
—Japanese purchases of a g r i c u l t u r a l , forestry and fishery 
products during the year ending biarch. 31 (19/3) w i l l increase 
about $390 m i l l i o n , and in addition, " I t i s expected that there 
w i l l be about $50 m i l l i o n i n special grains of purchases on the 
basis of reasonable prices."^^^ 
The document alao contained one surpr i s e — a n agreement that the 
governments vrould use their best e f f o r t s to establish at any early date 
a j o i n t working group to study the f e a s i b i l i t y of a j o i n t venture for 
construction i n the Ikiited States of a gasloUs diffusion enrichment 
f a c i l i t y . This f a c i l i t y , which the statement said would involve t o t a l 
investment of about $1 b i l l i o n , would be used to produce enriched 
uranium for peaceful uses such as nuclear power plants. The United 
States has long sought to Capitalize on i t s technological edge i n 
1 la-t h i s f i e l d . ^ 
on the trade question, Nixon and Tanaka agreed i t would be most 
valuable to hold future meetings at a high le v e l to review evolving 
economic relationships. And, the leaders said, they intend to hold a 
meeting of the join t U.S.-Japanese trade coniaittee sometime in 19/3.^^* 
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Bending Japan's Trade Barriers 
Nevertheless, the prospect for any quick surge of U.S. exports to 
Japan remains dim. Japanese businessmen have long held the flow of 
foreign consumer goods into t h e i r country to a t r i c k l e , while pumping 
ever more of t h e i r own products into world markets—particularly the 
Ikiited States. The Japanese eagerly buy American i n d u s t r i a l raw 
ma t e r i a l s — c o a l , steel scrap, and Ivunber—but the obstacles they put 
i n the way of foreign manufactured and consumer goods are s t i l l high. 
For example, due to the presence of outsized Japanese taxes based 
on a product's cost, a. set of golf club* that s e l l s for $200 i n the U.S. 
can go for as high as $500 in Japan; a pair of shoes that can be bought 
i n America for $48 costs Japanese consumers $110,^^* 
Some of these hurdles can, and no doubt w i l l , be lowered or removed 
as a result of further trade t a l k s ; the Japanese, seem to r e a l i z e that 
t h e i r import practices must be li b e r a l i z e d i f they are to avoid more 
protectionist r e t a l i a t i o n against t h e i r own goods abroad. However, 
Japan i s not a n easy market. The Japanese internal distribution system 
i s a ma.ze of middlemen, each taking h i s cut and pushing Import prices 
much higher than expected—and t h i s , probably the most formidable of 
the obstacles, cannot be lowered by diplomatic negotiations, 
Japanese-Chinese Relations 
Another move agreed upon at the Hawaii summit t a l k s was the deci-
sion that Japan and the U.S. each go their own way in improving r e l a -
tions with the Peoples'a Republic of China, with no effect on the 
U.S.-Japanese mutual security treaty, a key element i n the U.S.-Asian 
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policy (especially concerning the U.S. conunitraent to Taiwan). This 
decision was made in view of the formal announcement on August 13, l y / 2 , 
that Tanaka had succeeded in having himself invited to Peking with the 
assvimption that the proposed v i s i t would normalize Japanese-Coramunist 
Chinese r e l a t i o n s . 
The agreement by Peking and Tokyo to end t h e i r seventy-eight 
years of h o s t i l i t y opened a new era of hope for a more peaceful, 
prosperous, and stable A s i a . Tanaka said that normal relations are 
only the f i r s t step, and that he w i l l t r y his best to continue the trend 
of rapprochement and attempt to capture for Japan the vast Chinese 
market for Nipponese products and technological know-how, 
By establishing normal relations with China, Japan has given her-
self maneuvering room as a new balance of p o l i t i c a l power emerges i n 
A s i a — a balance she now holds. Adding t h i s credit to her endless l i s t 
of accomplishments, she has achieved in only a few short decades what 
has taken centuries to develop i n the West—the creation of a modern 
nation, with a modern i n d u s t r i a l structure, and modern p o l i t i c a l i n s t i -
tutions. The question that Japan now faces to answer i s , "Can she 
survive economic growth?" 
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CAN JAPAN SURVIVE ECONOMIC GRO(JTH 
As a country with perhaps the world's highest and most sustained 
rate of economic growth, Japan i s a fascinating study not only of 
rapid i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n but also of the environmental disruption that 
r e s u l t s when modernization comes too fast and haphazardly. In Japan, 
superexponential grovrth has so befouled the a i r and water that pollu-
tion has d i r e c t l y caused outbreaks of serious disease and death. I n 
f a c t , to the v i s i t i n g ecologist, Japan suggests what might happen the 
day before the earth poisons i t s e l f to death. I t almost seems as i f the 
Japanese had agreed to conduct a laboratory experiment to demonstrate 
the kinds of ecological horrors man i s capable of i n f l i c t i n g upon him-
s e l f without having to go to war. 
The underlying factors are not much different from those in other 
industrialized countries l i k e the United States and the Soviet Union. 
I t i s ju s t that they have a l l exploded so much faster and with a much 
greater intensity i n the crc«>jded Japanese islands. After World War I I 
the g l o r i f i c a t i o n of an ever larger GNP formed the basis of a new 
materialism, which became a sacred obligation for a l l Japanese govern-
ments, businesses and trade unions. Anyone who mentioned the undesir-
able by-products of rapid economic growth was treated as a heretic. 
Consequently everjrthing possible was done to make conditions easy for 
the manufacturers. Few dared question the wisdom of discharging untreated 
waste into the nearest v^ater body or untreated smoke into the atmosphere. 
This silence was maintained by union leaders as well as most of the 
country's r a d i c a l s ; except for a few isolated voices, no one protested. 
An insistence on treatment of the various effluents would have necessitated 
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expenditures on treatment equipment that in turn would have given r i s e 
to higher operating costs. Obviously t h i s would have meant higher 
prices for Japanese goods, and ultimately fewer sales and lower 
i n d u s t r i a l growth and GNP, 
The reluctance to divert funds frora production to conservation 
i s explanation enough for a certain degree of pollution, but the 
situation was made worse by the type of technology the Japanese chose 
to adopt for t h e i r i n d u s t r i a l expansion. For the most part, they 
simply copied American i n d u s t r i a l methods. This meant that methods 
o r i g i n a l l y designed for use in a country that stretched from the 
A t l a n t i c to the P a c i f i c with lots of a i r and water to use as sewage 
receptacles were adopted for an area a fraction of the s i z e . Moreover 
the Japanese diet was much more dependent on water as a source of f i s h 
and as an input i n the i r r i g a t i o n of r i c e ; consequently discharged 
wastes b u i l t up much more rapidly i n the food chain. 
The rapid i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n was accompanied by a similar rapid 
urbanization. The r u r a l population, which constituted 48% of the 
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population i n 1930, f e l l to 20% i n 1970. The r e s t of the population 
has crowded into the c i t i e s , bringing additional wastes. Moreover 
as the national and personal wealth of the country has grown, con-
sumption has increased at an even faster rate. This means not only 
more s o l i d and liquid wastes waiting for disposal but also an increase 
i n congestion and combustion—inevitable by-products resulting from the 
increase of automobiles from twenty-three thousand cars in 194/ to two 
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m i l l i o n i n 1970, Moreover even though Japanese cars intended for the 
American market had been equipped with exhaust controls for some time, 
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no such equipment was required on Japanese cars produced for the 
domestic market u n t i l late 1970, 
I t was not u n t i l 1970 that the Japanese government agreed to con-
front the problem of pollution. By that time, the immense indu s t r i a l 
and population concentrations had aggravated a i r and water pollution 
to such an extent that there was, and s t i l l i s , an urgent need to 
increase the amount of investments in such urban projects as sewage 
systems, housing waste disposal, and road construction. However, the 
existing i n d u s t r i a l zones have already run out of space for new plants, 
forcing industries to seek and develop large t r a c t s of land in locations 
far removed frcxn the c i t i e s and towns. This w i l l d r a s t i c a l l y increase 
the f i n a n c i a l burden on industry and on the Government. 
Now, however, the Government i s i n the process of switching i t s 
domestic po l i c i e s from economic growth to those centered around improv-
ing the welfare and environment of the people—by increasing consumer 
spending, by cutting pollution, and by building the homes, roads, 
schools, hospitals and other public f a c i l i t i e s that were shoved aside 
during the i n i t i a l i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n drive. 
Kakuei Tanaka, Japan's pragmatic premier, plans to remodel his 
entire nation, "He t a l k s of creating a hundred new c i t i e s , each of 
250,000 population, and constructing a thousand new dams, mechanizing 
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agriculture, and building a vast conmunications system," According 
to the premier, h i s basic p r i o r i t y i s to accelerate Japan's int e r n a l 
develo^Kaent. He claims that t h i s year's budget of $48 b i l l i o n a l l o t t e d 
more than 607o to t h i s program which he c a l l s equivalent to Franklin 
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Roosevelt's New Deal except that t h i s "grand design" was not inspired 
by economic d e p r e s s i o n , W i t h i n two years, the s h i f t of national 
funds to domestic requirements and regularization of commercial and 
monetary relationships can, he believes, improve Japanese l i v i n g stan-
dards while simultaneously bringing about Japan's second economic 
miracle. (The f i r s t supposedly came to an end two years ago last 
sunaaer when the i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n boom of the 1960s ended.) 
The second economic miracle w i l l not be as splashy as the f i r s t 
one was, though. Real national production soared at a 12-to-13 percent 
a year pace in the l a t e 1960s. The forecast for the years ahead i s 
a more modest, but by Western standards s t i l l s t a r t l i n g , 9 percent 
a year increase. 
When w i l l i t end? 
Osamu Shimomura, the economist who devised the 1960 "income-doubling" 
plan that started the f i r s t miracle, says he believes i t w i l l be another 
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10 years before Japan has a r e l a t i v e l y mature economy. 
Saburo Okita, president of the prestigious Japan Economic Research 
Center, agrees. He predicts that the growth rate w i l l slow to 9 percent 
in the rest of the ly/Qs frcmi a surprising 10 percent for 19/2 and that 
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i t w i l l slow again to 6 percent in the 19808. Considering that 
the Ikiited States by way of contrast, considers that i t i s doing well 
i f i t can grow at an average rate of 4| percent a year, i t seems certain 
that Japan w i l l become the Country of the Century. 
6/ 
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